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West Virginia Law Review
Volume 64 December 1961 Number I
The Thrust of Tort Law
Part I
The Influence of Environment*
LEON GREEN**
The common law forms of action, trespass and trespass on
the case, gave much of body and spirit to the law of tort. In so far
as can be ascertained from the reports prior to the 1800's its develop-
ment was slow and restricted.' Whether this was due to the en-
vironmental scarcity of injuries now classed as torts, to the disincli-
nation or inability of injured persons to litigate, or to the tight pro-
cedural restrictions of the actions themselves is not known. But we
do know that in the late 1700's and the first half of the 1800's when
forms of action were falling apart, tort law began a development
that is still under way. The theories of liability retarded for so
long a time became the cores of what we now know as actions
for trespass, negligence, nuisance, conversion, deceit, defamation and
other actions, each with a network of defensive doctrines, and cap-
able of caring for a limitless number of cases over the whole field
of injuries to person, property and relations resulting from the
activities of a massive population.
It is to be noted that this expansion of tort law is the product
of the courts with minor assistance of legislatures. It is the achieve-
ment of case by case decisions by widely separated courts from
* This article was originally delivered as the first of three lectures
of the Edward G. Donley Memorial Lectures of 1961. The two other lectures
of the series will appear in subsequent issues of the Review. The Edward G.
Donley Memorial Lectures of 1961 were delivered on April 17 and 18, 1961
at the West Virginia University College of Law.
** Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Texas.
IWigmore, Responsibiliy for Tortious Acts: Its History (pts. 1-3), 7
HRv. L. Rnv. 315, 383, 442 (1894); W-EILD, TORT ch. 2 (1931).
[1]
1
Green: The Thrust of Tort Law Part I: The Influence of Environment
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1961
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
numerous jurisdictions over nearly two centuries in time. It is not
too much to say that tort law has been given direction and flex-
ibility by environments constantly kept in flux by the rapid turn-
over of professional personnel and a constant procession of inven-
tions, discoveries, processes, economic developments and social at-
titudes which have so abundantly characterized this period. It is
indeed remarkable how closely tort law tends to follow and reflect
environment, though at times it may be stymied by shortsighted
administration.
UNLAWFULNESS
Professor Ferdinand Stone, in one of his most sparkling essays'
indicates that unlawfulness is the most ancient touchstone of tort
liability-this even before tort and crime became the basis of
separate actions. This corresponds to the protection needed at that
early period by the group, and also the protection needed by the
individual for himself and for his possessions, against violent harms.
The unlawfulness of a defendant's conduct is one of the basic factors
by which the expansion and elaborate doctrinal structure of tort
law has been achieved and sustained. Practically all common law
crimes are held to be the basis of tort liability.3 This is true in
large degree even as to police regulations of state and municipality,
as witness the use made by the courts of traffic regulations in
actions for negligence. It is not unusual for a court, when dealing
with some new problem, to rely on criminal statutes as the ex-
pression of public policy adequate for imposing tort liability or
interposing a defense, as the case may be.4
RECOMPENSE
Antedating unlawfulness, however, is the more basic concept
of the common law, and doubtless of all tort law, that one who
hurts another should make recompense.' Dean Ames in his well
2 Ferdinand Stone, Touchstones of Tort Liability, 2 STAN. L. Rnv. 259
(1950).
'Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM.
L. Rxv. 21 (1949); Note, The Use of Criminal Statutes in the Creation of
New Torts, 48 COLUM. L. Rav. 456 (1948); Thayer, Public Wrong and
Private Action, 27 HIv. L. Rav. 317 (1914).
4 Waynich v. Chicago Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959);
Bishop v. Liston, 112 Neb. 559, 190 N.W. 825 (1924); Rappaport v. Nichols,
31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552, 324
S.W.2d 201 (1959).
5 Wigmore, supra note 1; 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 44-52
(3rd ed. 1923); Jeremiah Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability--Suggested
Changes in Classification (pts. 1-3), 30 H~Av. L. Rlv. 241, 319, 409 (1917).
But see, HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 88-96 (1881); MoRuus, ToRTs 9 (1953).
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known essay, "Law and Morals", 6 thought this concept of recom-
pense "unmoral". Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. in his classic, The
Common Law says: "My aim and purpose have been to show that
the various forms of liability known to modem law spring from
the common ground of vengeance."7 He insisted that the "early
forms of procedure were grounded in vengeance",' and that "private
liability started from the notion of actual intent."9 While the records
available can be so read, they can also be read, and it is believed
more rationally, to require the one who has hurt another, however
innocently, to make atonement, expiation or reparation for the hurt.
The forms of retribution exacted by our forbears may seem crude and
impelled by religious compulsions foreign to our modem notions,
but they can also be conceived as the highest expressions of morality.
At least as the records become clearer there is no doubt that recom-
pense in damages"0 has been the remedy sought by the victim, and
in absence of some strong countervailing factor, has been the remedy
given by the court.
Why should it be thought "unmoral" to require one who has
hurt another, however innocently or accidentally, to make repara-
tion for the hurt while he who inflicted the hurt goes without re-
sponsibility? It may well be that down to this day the strongest
bastion of tort law is found in the strong reaction of the human
heart that one who hurts his brother should make recompense, and
that the escapes from that responsibility found in modem tort law
represent a compromise of morals with other considerations. Pro-
fessor James believes, and I agree, that the "heterogeneous law of
torts did not grow up because it was inspired by any one integrating
principle",' but however eroded the principle has become, if any
622 HARv. L. Rnv. 97 (1908). Many other writers have supported the
view expressed by Dean Ames. See Wigmore, supra note 1, and the long
list of writings examined by Jeremiah Smith, supra note 5. But ef. HOLMES,
THM COMMON LAW, chs. 1 and 2. And see especially Isaacs, Fault and Lia-
bility, 31 HARv. L. RPv. 954 (1918), in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF
TORTs 235 (1924); Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 L.Q. Rnv.
37 (1926).
7 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 37 (1881).
8 Id., at 2.9 1d., at 4.
10 2 HoLDsWORTH, op. cit. supra note 5 at 44-52, Lambert v. Bessey, Sir.
T. Raymond, 421, 467, 83 Eng. Rep. 220, 244 (1680); Basely v. Clarkson,
3 Lev. 37, 83 Eng. Rep. 565 (1681); See McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES 21-28 (1936).
"Fleming James, Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to The Judicial
Process, 8 BUFFALO L. Rv. 315 (1959). For an analysis of the opposing
views of English writers see the excellent article of Professor Glanville Wil-
liams, The Foundation of Tortious Liability, 7 CAmB. L.J. 111 (1939); also,
Probert, Speaking of Torts, 49 Ky. L.J. 114 (1960).
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one principle can be found running the entire length of tort law,
it is the concept of recompense.' 2 It would seem that unlawfulness
is but an explicit expression of this more basic concept and that the
forms of action of trespass and trespass on the case were fashioned
to accommodate them both. It will be recalled how strictly liability
was imposed by both actions and how slowly even self-defense and
accident came to be recognized as defenses.
In Weaver v. Ward (1616) " plaintiff and defendant were
soldiers in the same company engaged in skirmishing when de-
fendant's musket was discharged and plaintiff wounded. The court
held that defendant must show the shooting to have been utterly
without his fault, as for example, that plaintiff or someone else struck
the musket and caused it to fire. In some jurisdictions this strictness
of liability for injuries inflicted by firearms continues," and even
in jurisdictions where liability has been transferred to a basis of
negligence the modification is slight and any unlawfulness of con-
duct imposes strict liability.'5
Late in the 1700's, in the celebrated squib case,' 6 two of the
judges relied heavily on the unlawfulness of the defendant's throwing
the squib into the market place as a trespass on the plaintiff, al-
though the squib had been tossed about by several other persons
before it exploded in plaintiff's face. Blackstone, on the other hand,
insisted that the injury was the indirect result of the defendant's act
and therefore the action must lie, if at all, in trespass on the case.
A fourth judge agreed with Blackstone that the question before the
12 See Isaacs, supra note 6. Aside from the strict liabilty imposed under
the forms of action, the concept of recompense is strongly reflected in the
maxim, "Sic utere tuo alienum non laedas" recognized in numerous modem
tort cases. See 3 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 375-80; 8 id. at 462-72.
It is also the underlying basis of the "Prima Facie Tort" doctrine first
suggested by POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS (lst ed. 1887) and approved by Holmes
in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904). See Halpern, Intentional Torts
and the Restatement, 7 BUFFALO L. Rnv. 7 (1957); Green, Protection of
Trade Relations Under Tort Law, 47 VA. L. REV. 559 (1961).
The recompense concept is clearly the principle underlying the doctrine
of "Restitution" now so widely accepted. See York, Extension of Restitution
Remedies in Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 499 (1957).
3 3 Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 134, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616).
'
4 Norling v. Carr, 211 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1954); Hawksley v. Peace,
38 R.I. 544, 95 Atl. 856 (1916); Isham v. Dow's Estate, 70 Vt. 588, 41 Atl.
585 (1898).
'
5 Jensen v. Minard, 44 Cal. 2d 325, 282 P.2d 7 (1955), citing with
approval Corn v. Sheppard, 179 Minn. 490, 229 N.W. 869; Summers v. Tice,
33 Cal. 2d 1, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
16Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Wm. BI. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (C. P. 1773).
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court was the proper form of action rather than the unlawfulness
of defendant's conduct but agreed with the other two judges that the
injury was direct and therefore trespass. Under either action there
was liability. Throwing squibs had been made a nuisance by statute
after the plaintiff's injury, but the majority would not look with
eagle's eyes at the theory as long as justice had been done. Un-
lawfulness alone, though buttressed by recompense, proved an
insufficient basis for the development of tort law over the long
period from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century. Other factors
came to require consideration.
INTENTION
Professor Stone' 7 indicates how intention as an additional touch-
stone of liability was necessitated by the changing environment
from feudal to a broader economic and social order based on in-
dustry, goods and trade, together with a fuller recognition of the
individual's rights and responsibilities. But as long as trespass and
trespass on the case were distinguishable on the basis of direct and
consequential harms and between them shared tort liability for in-
juries resulting from violence, intention was of little importance
except in the determination of damages and in the action for deceit
and actions for other non-violent harms in process of emerging.'"
Intent was an incident of consensual transactions and did not achieve
any great importance in tort law until after the action for negligence
had largely superseded the actions for trespass and trespass on the
case. It then became highly important in distinguishing intended
from negligent and accidental harms. As we now know, intent is
a highly ambiguous concept which may mean merely that the
conduct was intended, or it may mean that the consequences of the
conduct were intended. If the consequences are not intended, intent
may be implied, presumed,' 9 constructed,2" or even transferred.2'
This fictional usage of intent is highly important in cases in which
1 'Supra note 2.
18 ee Wigmore, supra note 1. Also see opinions of the judges in Pasley
v. Freeman, 3 Term Rep. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789); WmrmLD, TORT
34 (1931).
19 Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B.D. 57; Johnson v. Sampson, 167
Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814, 46 A.L.R. 772 (1926).2 0 Reynolds v. Pierson, 29 Ind. App. 273, 64 N.E. 484 (1902).
21 James v. Campbell, 5 Car. & P. 372, 172 Eng. Rep. 1015 (C.P. 1832);
Talmage v. Smith, 101 Mich. 370, 59 N.W. 656 (1894).
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the line between intended and negligent harms is blurred, or in
fact does not exist.
22
NEGLIGENCE
The introduction of the negligence concept is identified by
Professor Stone23 as the third touchstone of tort law. The revolu-
tionary changes in the environment of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries required a further modification of the base of tort law
from that provided by unlawfulness, recompense and intention.
For a period extending until late in the 1800's this new action
for negligence was frequently called an action on the case for neg-
ligence, but quite unlike the action on the case for trespass, liability
under the negligence action was modified by numerous limitations,
immunities, and defenses.2 4 Parallel with this development came the
modem action of trespass which for personal injuries is normally
restricted to some form of intentional invasion of the personality,
though in an action of trespass to property intention is usually not
required.25 Many vestiges of the trespass form of action are found
in the modem trespass action, and many vestiges of the action for
trespass on the case are found in the action for negligence.
NEW CLASSIFICATION
The new classification of tort law necessitated by the action for
negligence is roughly indicated as (1) intended harms, (2) unin-
tended harms, i.e., negligent and accidental harms and (3) harms
for which there is strict liability. The classification is by no means
precisional and much confusion is found in appellate court opinions
22Dne v. Johnston, 104 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1958); Mohr v. Williams, 95
Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W.
403 (1891).2 3 Supra note 2.24 See Malone, Ruminations on Group Interests and the Law of Torts,
13 RuTGERs L. Rgv. 565 (1959); GREEN, Tnt.IC VicriMs 10-13 (1958).
25 Pfeiffer v. Grossman, 15 Ill. 53 (1853); Van Alstyne v. Rochester
Tel. Corp., 163 Misc. 258, 296 N.Y. Supp. 726 (Rochester City Ct. 1937);
Newsom v. Anderson, 24 N.C. 42 (1841). The line here indicated is not
always respected. Personal injury incidental to trespass on land may be
included by way of "aggravation" although there is no intent to hurt the
person. Brackett v. Bellows Falls Hydro-Elec. Corp., 87 N.H. 173, 175
Atl. 822 (1934). There may be trespass to land and no liability. Phillips v.
Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954), noted 40 CORNELLL.Q.
387 (1954); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 166, 380 (1939). See the illuminating
study in Keeton & Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry (pt. 2),
39 T.xAs L. RPnv. 253 (1961).
[ Vol. 64
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during the period of transition from the earlier bases of liability
to those now current.26
For a century before the new classification was definitely
formulated, and during its formative period, its influence marked
a revolutionary change in tort law.27 As already indicated, the basic
philosophy of medieval tort law was that one who suffered physical
hurt to his person or property as a result of the conduct of another
was entitled to reparation for his hurt. The forms of action sup-
ported this philosophy but it was greatly qualified by the concepts
of intent and negligence which were equated with the concept of
fault. The concept of fault has been widely considered as identifying
tort law with morality. "Liability based on fault" has been set over
against "liability without fault" which is supposed to be "unmoral."
In fact, the so-called "liability based on fault" was a precipitous
retreat from the stricter morality of recompense. "Fault" has thus
become a schizophrenic concept with a moral connotation in every-
day life, but as employed in cases of unintended hurts it usually
has no moral content. More of this later. It is enough for the
moment to say that for almost the entire nineteenth century the
concern of the courts was focussed on the liberation of the defendant
from liability and this was accomplished under the cover of "fault". 8
Emphasis was shifted from hurt to blame. Even so able a scholar
as Holmes, possibly suffering from the astigmatism produced by
the tremendous development of tort law at the time he wrote, de-
clared: "The general principle of our law is that loss from accident
must lie where it falls"."9 And more lately this has been expanded
by another great scholar, Professor Morris, into a basic axiom that
"a loss should lie where it happened to fall unless some affirmative
public good will result from shifting it."'"
This concern for defendants throughout the 1800's was almost
an obsession in the area of unintended hurts, but was also quite
marked in the area of intended hurts. In cases of intended violent
harms, self-defense, the defense of others, or the protection of prop-
26 James, supra note 11; Smith, supra note 5; Isaacs, supra note 6.
27Harvey v. Dunlop, Hill & D. Supp. 193 (N.Y. 1843); Hartfield v.
Roper, 21 Wend. 615 (N.Y. 1839); Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.)
292 (1850); Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62 (1835); Stanley v. Powell, [1891]
1 Q.B.D. 86; Holmes v. Mather, L.R. 10 Ex. 261 (1875).
21 See Probert, Speaking of Torts, 49 Ky. L.J. 114 (1960), for analysis
indicating the pull of the fault concept.29
THE COMMON LAw 94 (1881).
30 MoRIs, TORTS 8 (1953).
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erty, consent, provocation and mitigation of damages became first
line defenses freeing many defendants from liability. In cases of
unintended harms the defenses of no duty, no negligence, assumed
risk, contributory negligence, proximate cause, accident, fellow
servant, independent contractor, imputed negligence, trespasser and
licensee, and many refinements of each of these doctrines, made it
almost impossible for the traveler, employee, a person entering an-
other's premises, a tenant, a customer, consumer, patient, a by-
stander, or other person, to maintain an action for damages for
personal injury. All these doctrines were based ostensibly on the
concept of "fault"--largely upon the fault of the victim, while the
fault of the defendant was ignored.
It was the middle of the 1800's before an action for death
could be maintained and even then it was subject to all the defenses
available in a personal injury action and many more." In most
jursidictions it was much later before a personal injury action sur-
vived the death either of the victim or tortfeasor. Only in cases
involving passengers and goods transported by carrier did claimant
have a relatively firm basis for recovery.32 In these cases liability
was thought to be determined by contract rather than tort, though
later it was shifted to the tort basis with considerable expansion
in defenses. In the area of trade, actions for deceit," slander, and
libel,"4 were likewise limited by phalanxies of defenses almost im-
penetrable. The protection of the family against sexual pirates,
kidnappers of children, and slanders was limited by numerous de-
fenses.35 Most of the injuries resulting from the negligent conduct
of municipalities, charitable hospitals, builders and contractors, man-
ufacturers and suppliers of goods were outside the protection of
law. People could not live and do business on the high level of
31 Lord Campbell's Act, 1846 9 & 10 Viet. ch. 93. Massachusetts had
previously enacted a very limited death statute. See, Carey v. Berkshire
R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848).
32 Stokes v. Saltonstall, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 181 (1839); Hall v. Connecti-
cut River Steamboat Co., 13 Conn. 319 (1839); McElroy v. Nashua &
L. R.R., 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 401 (1849); Ware v. Gay, 38 Mass. (11 Pick.)
106 (1831).
33 Sherwood v. Salmon, 2 Day 128 (Conn. 1805): "Whatever morality
may require, it is too much for commerce to require that the vendor should
see for the purchaser."34 Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co., L.R.
9 Ex. 218 (1873); Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 CoLuM. L. Rav.
121 (1913).35 Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650, 72 A.L.R. 842 (1930);
Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cases 577, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861); Winsmore
v. Greenbank, Willes. 577, 125 Eng. Rep. 1330 (C.P. 1745).
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8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [1961], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol64/iss1/2
THRUST OF TORT LAW: I
morality required by the concept of recompense, or so it was
thought. 6 The environment demanded much new law to reduce the
severity of the orthodox common law, and the courts responded.
They developed the defensive doctrines of tort law as naturally as
the weeds and flowers come to the landscape in response to spring-
time, and from as many different seeds-a splotch here and a splotch
there, but eventually in great profusion. But why so much law
created so favorably for defendants and so little for their victims?
Why was the historic principle of recompense so widely abandoned?
There were many factors involved. Let us consider some of the
more important ones.
RESTRICTIONS ON LIABILITY
The late 1700's and the 1800's in England and America were
periods of expanding frontiers in all directions-territory, population,
mobility, trade, commerce, finance, speculation, construction, inven-
tion-innumerable activities of many types devoted primarily to
the acquisition of wealth. In America it was a period of enter-
prise and mobility in which the whole population was engaged
and upon which its welfare depended. It was a mass movement
with all the characteristics of a glacier in which the individual was
merged for better or for worse. His fortune was tied up with that
of the group and it was the group's interest in a world of wealth
and jobs that dominated the environment.
COURT ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES
Tort law, as was true of other law, was caught up in this move-
ment. Legislatures were as busy making laws as the farmers were
in growing crops and cattle and the factories in making goods. But
tort law was left almost untouched by legislation for the courts
to continue their historic function and responsibility in its creation
case by case. In large degree in this country and not much less
so in England each trial court had great independence; an organized
system of courts came later in the century. While appellate courts
generally conceived their functions to be the detection of errors
in the trial process, and if errors were found to remand for a new
36 Losee v. Buchannan, 51 N.Y. 576 (1873); Ryan v. New York Central
R.R., 53 N.Y. 210 (1866); Russell v. Men of Devon County, 16 East 305,
100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788); Southcote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247, 156
Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1856); Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152
Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep.
1030 (Ex. 1837).
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trial, yet they wrote seriously in developing a body of law by judicial
decision. 7 It was well after the middle of the century, however,
before a body of tort law came into existence and the authoritative
power of appellate decision became reinforced by a doctrine of
stare decisis, which though often discussed played little part in re-
stricting a court's power to reach the decision considered desirable. 8
The ever increasing volume of new problems were frequently dealt
with through analogies rather than precedent and thus the courts
were constantly making new precedents, and as a court was free to
accept the reasoning of courts of another jurisdiction this process
accelerated the growth of decisional law very greatly. In fact the
development of tort law during most of the 1800's was in practical
respects one of free decision, but free decision employed by the
courts to impose doctrinal restrictions upon themselves-restrictions
which the courts of the 1900's have spent much of their time re-
jecting.
The tort law of the 1800's was thus greatly influenced by the
substantive procedures of litigation. Aside from the straight jackets
of pleading under the forms of action, retained in some jurisdictions
at least in name until this century, 9 the forms of action greatly
impaired the development of the doctrinal substantive procedures.
For example, the action of negligence required a wide spread of
doctrine. There had to be some limit beyond which causal relation
between a defendant's conduct and a resulting consequence would
not be recognized. Some method had to be provided for the determi-
nation of duties and the risks which fell within their scope in all
the limitless activities involving dangers to which people were sub-
jected. There had to be reliable formulas for determining the af-
firmative and defensive issues of negligence at common law and
for statutory violations. The sufficiency of evidence on fact issues
for submission to a jury in so many different types of cases pre-
sented innumerable difficulties and still does not submit to any
patented solution. Measures for the determination of damages have
from the beginning suffered from uncertainty and instability. With
17 See POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAw, chs. 1, 3 (1938);
Pound, THE SPnUT OF THE COMMON LAW, chs. 2, 5 (1921); Pound, The
Place of Judge Story in the Making of American Law, 48 AM. LAw REv.
676 (1914); GRAY, NATURE AND SoUcRCES OF LAW 244 (2d ed. 1921); Green,
The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 40 ILL. L. REV. 303 (1946).
368 Ibid.
" Silverstein, A Basic Introduction to the New West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure, 62 W. VA. L. REv. 117, (1960); see, excellent opinion of
Smith, J., in Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
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the constant increase of new dangers and the severity of old dangers,
the whole doctrinal structure of negligence law was constantly under
pressures it could not withstand and was constantly in disrepair.
What was true of negligence was also true of nuisance and deceit.
The readjustments required in the judicial process and its substantive
doctrines throughout the 1800's in order to meet the problems of
a revolutionary century account for many of the opinions and de-
cisions which now seem so remote from good sense. Thus was tort
law influenced by the inner structure of the processes through which
it was created.
LITIGATION IMBALANCE
During most of the 1800's the injured person was at a great
disadvantage in obtaining competent advocates and in financing a
long, drawn-out lawsuit. Personal injury suits were not held in favor
by the legal profession until this century, and by some of its mem-
bers not even at present, though by all moral standards it should
be at the ethical top of all civil litigation. On the whole, claimants
were pitted against the more substantial citizens of a community,
and their lawyers were pitted against the best defensive talent that
money could buy. However meritorious the claimant's case and
however persuasive his lawyer before trial judge and jury, they faced
a relatively more powerful defendant and an advocate who was
skilled in the pitfalls of trial and the preservation of a record full
of errors for review by an appellate court. In the appellate court
a claimant was usually outgunned. Strong advocates who pressed
the newly spun defenses with their metaphysical logic played heavily
in a defendant's favor. The result was that the imbalance of wealth
of the parties and the talents of advocates accounts for much of the
imbalanced tort law of the 1800's.
ATTITUDE OF JUDGES
Another influence which tilted tort law defensively was the
attitude and outlook of the judges. Judges were good citizens, sensi-
tive for most part to the functions of judges as generally conceived
at that time. As were other people, they were part and parcel of
their environment. They were perfectly ready to declare the law
but with rare exceptions they did not look upon themselves as
obligated to fashion the law and keep it in adjustment with the
ever-changing environment. Most of them rejected the function of
law-making while at the same time making law with every decision.
1961]
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They accepted the newly fashioned negligence law with all its de-
fensive limitations as it had been developed by the late 1800's and
were in accord with its philosophy. This attitude resulted in what
Dean Pound characterized as a sterile mechanical jurisprudence. ' *
The feeling was that enterprise should not be burdened by heavy
verdicts. Everyone had a stake in its solvency and prosperity. Dam-
age suits for personal injury or death were often referred to as
efforts to obtain "blood money." When juries reacted favorably to
the injured victim their verdicts were frequently rendered futile by
the legal doctrines administered by the courts. Only a few reported
cases"' heralded the reaction to come in the current century and
they were under violent attack by the profession for many years.
FAULT-MORALITY
The equating of negligence with fault, and fault with morality,
has been mentioned as an influential factor in tort liability. This
gave deep satisfaction to the professional conscience of the 1800's
and still does so in many quarters. The victim whose careless con-
duct contributed to his own hurt cut himself off from the court's
protection. This was a risk the courts would not impose upon
the defendant. Nor would the courts compare faults even though
the defendant's fault might be greater than that of the victim. Why
did the courts penalize the victim so severely and let the defendant
go free? This severity cannot be justified on any basis of morality.
Even in cases of intended hurt the much stronger defense of consent
is frequently allowed in mitigation of damages and is sometimes re-
jected altogether. "2 Why did not the courts allow the victim's care-
lessness in mitigation? That would have seemed the moral way.
4
1 Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARv. L. Rav. 802, 808
(1923).
" Among the notable cases of this period favorable to plaintiffs are:
Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408 (1892); Milwaukee & St.
P. Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1887); Sioux City & P. R. v. Stout, 84 U.S.(17 Wall.) 657 (1873); Montgomery & E. Ry. v. Mallette, 92 Ala. 209, 9
So. 363 (1891); Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890); Rylands
v. Fletcher, L.R. 3, H.L. 330 (1868).
See, Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without Per-
mission (pts. 1-2), 11 HARv. L. Rnv. 349, 434 (1898) for strictures on the
Stout doctrine. The rejection of Rylands v. Fletcher was at first almost
universal by American courts though today, as with Stout, it, or its equivalent,
is generally accepted. Bedell v. Goulter, 199 Ore. 344, 261 P.2d 842 (1953);
Donley, Some Aspects of Tort Liability in the Mining of Coal, 61 W. VA. L.
REv. 243 (1959).
42 Christopherson v. Bare, 11 Q.B. 473, 116 Eng. Rep. 554 (1848);
WINFIELD, TORT 87 (1931). See also, Joy v. Brown, 173 Kan. 833, 252
P.2d 889 (1953); Morris v. Miller, 83 Neb. 218, 119 N.W. 458 (1909);
Royer v. Belcher, 100 W. Va. 694, 131 S.E. 556, 47 A.L.R. 1089 (1926).
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How explain this wide departure from the concept of recompense
and how explain this use of "fault" to shift the loss from defendant
to his victim? Fault in a moral sense would be relevant only if
there were intent or wilfulness to inflict the harm and thus be a
basis for increasing the damages by way of punishment. But here
"fault" is nothing more than the failure to exercise the care of an
ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances; at most the viola-
tion of a legal standard of conduct determined by court and jury
after the conduct has done its hurt. In that sense any conduct in
violation of a legal standard in any area of law is fault, and so it is.
But if the conduct is intended, fault is not needed for intention is
enough. If the conduct is only in violation of the standard of care,
fault is not needed for negligence is enough. Once intention and
negligence are substituted for recompense the concept of fault is
no longer valid as a moral basis for determining liability.43 It no
longer serves a useful classificatory function.
It is believed that the concept of negligence and the whole
defensive array of assumed risk, contributory negligence, proximate
cause, imputed negligence, accident, and their kindred, ostensibly
based on fault, represent a flight from morality and are based upon
the demands of a revolutionary environment which captured the
minds of judges and the people they served. The break with the
morality of the orthodox common law was so great that the judges
could not accept it until they had convinced themselves they were
inaugurating a more refined and rational morality as a basis of
liability. They were judging something new to them-the risks of
enterprise 44-- the economic good of the community-but they con-
tinued to talk the law's language of sin.
43 Professor Isaacs in his valuable essay, Fault and Liability, 31 HAIv.
L. REv. 954 (1918) quotes a passage from HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW,
as follows: "The law started from those intentional wrongs which are the
simplest and most pronounced cases, as well as the nearest to the feelings
of revenge which leads to self-redress. It thus naturally adopted the vocabu-
lary, and in some degree the tests of morals. But as the law has grown
even when its standards have continued to model themselves upon those of
morality, they have necessarily become external because they have considered
not the actual condition of the particular defendant, but whether his conduct
would have been wrong in the fair average member of the community, whom
he is expected to equal at his peril." Professor Isaacs adds: "The law begins
with liability based on fault, and tends, as it grows, to formulate external
standards which may subject an individual member of society to liability
though there is no fault in him."
44See Ehrensweig, Loss Shifting and Quasi-Negligence: A New In-
terpretation of the Palsgraf Case, 8 UNiv. Cm. L. Rav. 729 (1941). Also,
see Malone's penetrating article, Ruminations on Group Interests and the
Law of Torts, 13 RUTGERs L. Rav. 565 (1959).
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It is believed to be significant that assumed risk-mother con-
cept of all negligence defensive doctrines-was translated into con-
tributory negligence, proximate cause, and accident in three other-
wise unimportant landowner-traveller cases. In Butterfield v. For-
rester 5 a landowner had partially blocked a highway by a barrier
with which the plaintiff's horse collided and the plaintiff hurt. At
that time the landowner was under no liability for injury to a tres-
passer except for intended hurt. A trespasser assumed all other
risks. The landowner was permitted great freedom in the use of
the highway adjacent to his premises even to the extent of stacking
wood in the road,46 and staking out his animals to graze beside the
highway.4" The court required the rider whose horse collided with
the barrier to show himself without fault, and did the same in
holding the traveller liable for permitting his team to collide with the
highly publicized hobbled ass.4" In Flower v. Adam, 9 the defendant
had piled rubbish in the street. The dust whirling from the pile
frightened plaintiff's horse. Plaintiff in the attempt to control his
bolting horse pulled heavily on the reins. The wheel of the chaise
in which plaintiff was riding struck another pile of rubbish. The
horse was further frightened and the chaise upset with serious in-
jury to plaintiff. Mansfield, C.J., instructed the jury "that if the
mishap was occasioned either by pure accident or owing to the
plaintiff not being a very skillful charioteer, the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover." After verdict for defendant, on motion for new
trial, Mansfield opined: "I rather think it is either accident or
inability in the driver." Lawrence, J., added: "The immediate and
proximate cause is the unskillfulness of the driver."
Today these cases would be decided against the landowner,"0
but their doctrines transplanted in other soils persist in many juris-
dictions with slight modifications. In the meantime the highway
traveller as against the landowner has come to be one of the most
protected persons known to the law of torts." How these defenses
4 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
46 Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824).
4 7 Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842).4 8 Ibid.
492 Taunton's Rep. 314, 127 Eng. Rep. 1098 (C.P. 1810).
5o See judgment of Denning, L.J. in Davies v. Swan Motor Co., [ 1949]
2 K.B. 291; Deane v. Johnston, 104 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1958).
1' Hagy v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265
P.2d 86 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Drew v. Gross, 112 Ohio St. 485, 147 N.E.
757 (1925); Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 72 (Exch. 1863); Malone, supra
note 44.
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and those kindred to them which place the risks of injury entirely
upon the victim and allow the initial wrongdoer to go free is one
of the anomalies of twentieth century tort law. It is true that the
courts are finding ways to avoid their severity in some cases and
legislatures in some jurisdictions have enacted comparative negli-
gence statutes,52 but by and large the efforts of the courts to attune
these doctrines to the modem environment have been clumsy and
unreliable. In case after case the courts still interpose the assumed
risk-contributory negligence-proximate cause group of defensive
doctrines as a matter of law to relieve negligent defendants of lia-
bility. Throughout the period when negligence doctrines were being
developed in such profusion the courts talked endlessly about fault,
but what they were doing was freeing enterprise from liability for
the common welfare at the expense of its victims and attempting
to justify their harshness towards the victims and their wide de-
parture from early common law by cloaking their doctrines in terms
of morality. The judges were not hypocrites. They were merely
the mouthpiece of the environment-an environment dedicated to
the acquisition of wealth and the building of a strong economic
social order. Nor are the judges who continue to speak these doc-
trines hypocrites. They are merely the captives of a day gone by.
It is all very confusing to everyone-litigant, advocate, judge, teacher,
and student. The environment of today struggles to break through
the doctrinal overcast of yesterday. It succeeds more and more
frequently. When it fails, failure is usually due to judges who either
do not comprehend the obligations imposed by the power vested
in them, or else are too fearful to make use of it.
LEGAL FAULT
Professor Stone identifies a fourth touchstone of tort liability
presently emerging which he terms "legal fault."53 The term is given
a breadth of meaning capable of including unlawfulness, intent,
negligence, strict liability, and perhaps more, but he thinks it too
early to indicate its bounds more definitely. Professor Robert Keeton
in a highly provocative and significant article has suggested "condi-
52 Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed
Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. RPv. 135 (1958); Peck, Comparative Negligence
and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MicH. L. Rnv. 689 (1960). Most
of the voluminous literature on the subject is cited in these articles.
11 Touchstones of Tort Liability, 2 STAN. L. REv. 259, 277 (1950).
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tional fault" as at least a partial coverage of the same area."4 Either
term seems inadequate. "Fault" can only be used in this connection
to indicate failure to live up to some standard imposed by law.
In this sense it is question-begging, confusing, and not needed. If
it is used to give a moral flavor to liability the result is a resurrection
of the early concept of recompense or reparation. In other words,
in view of the great danger to the victim involved in the defendant's
conduct liability will be imposed without more. The term "strict
liability" is generally employed to indicate this type of case but is
not a happy one inasmuch as the term is little more than a tab
after liability has been held to be strict.5" "Enterprise liability,"
given general usage by Professor Ehrenzweig, more nearly hits the
mark.56 Whether a more descriptive term can be found is proble-
matical. Let us notice what has happened in the environment to
require the revision of tort law sought to be reflected by these terms.
NEW ENVIRONMENT
The period under consideration has its beginning in the latter
half of the 1800's but its significance was not fully recognized
until the 1900's were well under way. The tort law of the 1800's
remained dominant well into the twentieth century though it had
given way on several fronts and was under pressures on other fronts
somewhat earlier. By 1960 the face of tort law bore slight re-
semblance to its face in 1860." 7 As the 1800's wore on, the injuries
due to the cumulative mechanization and the steady multiplication
of industrial activities produced more and greater dangers for every-
one and his property. Employees, traders, customers, travellers, land
occupiers, professional men, and men, women, and children of every
walk of life were frequently the victims of these dangers. More-
over, the injuries suffered grew in severity on victim, family, and
community. People were maimed or killed in increasing numbers,
their fortunes were frequently caught up in fraudulent schemes and
their substance lost. Traders were put out of business by the piracies
of other traders. Business institutions grew financially strong, some-
times through exploitation of workers and customers. Railroads
14 Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv. L. REv. 401(1959); see Probert, Speaking of Torts, 49 Ky. L.J. 114 (1960) for comments
on "conditional fault concept."
11 See PRossmE, TORTS 315 (2d ed. 1955).5
6 EnRENZWIG, NEGLiGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951).5 7 Bohlem, Fifty Years of Tort Law, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725, 1225 (1937);
Green, The Law of Torts, in 3 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS (N. Y. Uni-
versity Press, 1936).
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were projected into every region, canals dug, rivers dredged, and
highways multiplied. Great construction of every sort followed in
the wake of these projects for the mobility of persons and goods.
The acquisition and selling of land, the developments of trading
centers, towns, and cities, the establishment of banks, mills, mines,
and factories; enterprise activities of every sort absorbed the interest
and energies of the ever-increasing population. Fortunes were made
and lost, but the urge to do and to get could not be restrained.
In the midst of this explosion of population, energy and efforts of
people engaged in making a new society; the private corporation
with its controls in the hands of the few came on the scene to play
a dominant part in every phase of peoples' lives. Many corporate
enterprises grew in power; many people grew rich; most of them
improved their economic status; enterprise prospered.
THE CORPORATE DEFENDANT
Among all these factors the appearance of the corporate de-
fendant did more, perhaps, than any other to influence the develop-
ment of tort law in the nineteenth century and this influence is still
strong. This was especially true in the case of the railroad in the
area of personal injury and property damage. It influenced legis-
latures to enact wrongful death statutes,5" fencing statutes,5 9 pre-
cautions against fire hazards,60 and collisions at railway crossings.
The dangers encountered on railway premises influenced the courts
to impose liability on landowners generally on behalf of trespassing
young children who were hurt on dangerous premises,6" to give
greater protection to victims of crossing accidents,63 and to increase
58 See 87 PARL. DEB. (3rd Ser.) House of Lords, May 7, 1847, House
of Commons, July 22, 1846, and House of Lords, August 21, 1846; Mass.
Acts, ch. 80 (1840); CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF rH STATE OF NEW
YORK, 1894 (Record, Vol. HI, Nos. 37, 57 pp. 593, 595, 852, 954, 961;
July 31, Aug. 16).
19 Bischof v. Illinois So. Ry., 232 Ill. 446, 83 N.E. 948 (1908); Di Caprio
v. New York Cent. R., 231 N.Y. 94, 131 N.E. 746, 16 A.L.R. 940 (1921).
6o St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Matthews, 165 U.S. 1 (1896).
61 See Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL.
L. Rav. 151 (1946); also, Malone's article, Ruminations on Group Interests
and the Law of Torts, supra note 44.
62 Sioux City & P. R.R. v. Stout, supra note 41; Green, Landowner's
Responsibility to Children, 27 TExAs L. REv. 1 (1948).63Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934); Grand Trunk Ry. Co.
of Canada v. Ives, supra note 41; Belcher v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 140 W. Va.
848, 87 S.E.2d 616 (1955).
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protection of persons and animals on right of ways." The defenses
of contributory negligence and proximate cause were considerably
modified in railway cases through extension of the last clear chance
doctrine," and the adoption of comparative negligence statutes."
Negligence law developed in the horse and buggy cases gave way
slowly and in varying degrees in nearly all jurisdictions during the
late 1800's. Most of its liberalization can be traced to the railroad
cases. The financial strength of the corporate defendant of every
class brought to the fore the ability of the defendant to absorb, or
at least to distribute the loss as an incident of the business in which
it might be engaged. The development has been long and often
retarded, and is still being fought out in pockets all over the American
scene.
It has often been said there is but one law for the weak and
the strong, the poor and the rich, and that justice is blind as to the
parties seeking her aid. This is only true as to the formal side of
the judicial process. It is not true and never has been true in the
administration of tort law. During most of the 1800's tort law favored
the strong and the rich, the group as against the individual, those
aggressively seeking power and status as against their victims. In
the late 1800's there came a reaction, which has grown stronger with
the years, to favor the weak, the poor and the individual as against
the corporate defendant. The concept of tort law as something im-
personal, unchanging, with the consistency of a precious stone
weighed in delicate scales of a blind lady is a myth-perhaps a
salutary myth but without substance. Tort law has swung far and
wide, and at times crazily, since the early 1800's. It is everyday law
with all the earthiness of the earthy; no better and no worse than
the people involved in its administration. A composite of their image
is reflected very accurately in the results of every litigated case.
ADVOCATE-JUDGE-DOCTRINE
In the meantime, the profession has increased in number, and
as tort law developed many lawyers became highly skilled in the
64Kunkumian v. City of New York, 306 N.Y. 167, 111 N.E.2d 865
(1953); Jenkins v. Southern Ry., 196 N.C. 466, 146 S.E. 83 (1929); Cin-
cinnati & Z. R.R. v. Smith, 22 Ohio St. 227, (1871); Dent v. Bellows Falls
& S. R. St. Ry., 95 Vt. 523, 116 Atl. 83 (1922); British Columbia Elec.
Ry. v. Loach, [1916] 1 App. Cas. 719 (P.C.).
61 Supra note 58. Ford v. Panhandle & S. F. Ry., 151 Tex. 538, 252
S.W.2d 561 (1952); Smith v. Gould, 110 W. Va. 579, 159 S.E. 53 (1931).
"1Bond v. Missouri P. R.R., 342 S.W.2d 473 (Ark. 1961); Maloney,
supra note 52, at 154.
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trial of tort cases. Plaintiffs have been relieved of the burdens
of financing their litigation in most jurisdictions through the legaliza-
tion of contingent fee arrangements and in some cases may be
sustained by the advancement of money by their lawyers. Damage
suit litigation became attractive to talented lawyers, and many who
earlier had found their way to the courthouse forum through
prosecution or defense of criminal cases now turned to personal
injury and other tort litigation. In recent years they have identified
themselves as claimant lawyers on the one hand, or defense lawyers
on the other, and each has a powerful and active organization pro-
moting the interests of its members.
ADVANCES ON WIDE FRONT
Under the influence of these lawyers, judges have been made
aware of the social and economic implications of the factual data
in tort litigation as well as of the implications of legal doctrines.
The balance of power between the respective advocates has been
more nearly restored, and the doctrines so excessively overweighted
in defendant's favor during the 1800's in most instances are being
more fairly stated and employed.67 Contributory negligence has
become an affirmative defense in most jurisdictions with the burden
on the defendant to maintain it, and is less likely to be treated as
assumed risk asserted by the court as a matter of law. 8 Last clear
chance has been broadened in its scope;69 proximate cause is not
infrequently used in a victim's behalf; 0 trespassers may become
licensees, or even invitees; in extreme cases ' res ipsa loquitur, first
available to the traveller 2 as against dangerous premises or activities
prejudicing the highway, has become available in almost every type
of tort case for unintended hurts"3 to ease or even carry the plaintiff's
67 The National Association of Claimants' Counsel of America (NA-
CCA) has tremendously broadened the understanding of the profession,
including the judges, of the significance of tort litigation and has advanced the
proficiency of advocacy immeasurably. Its efforts have been widely supported
and advanced by numerous institutes sponsored by bar associations and law
schools.68 See, PRossER, TORTS ch. 10 (2d ed. 1955).69 Supra notes 64, 65.70 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marshall, 222 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1955);
Girdner v. Union Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197, 13 P.2d 915 (1932); Ney v. Yellow
Cab Co., 2 MI1. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1953); Dent v. Bellows Falls & S. R.
St. Ry., supra note 64.
7, Gaylord Container Corp. v. Miley, 230 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1956);
Phipps v. Oregon R. & Nay. Co. 161 Fed. 376 (C.C.E.D. Wash. 1908);
Kallum v. Wheeler, 129 Tex. 74, 101 S.W.2d 225 (1937).72Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863);
PROssER, TORTS 199 (2d ed. 1955).7 3 PRossER, TORTS 211 (2d ed. 1955).
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burden of proof on the issue of negligence; 4 duties have been
broadened to include risks undreamed of by nineteenth century
courts;75 immunities of hospitals and other charitable institutions,76
municipalities,77 manufacturers,78 dealers,79 builders and contrac-
tors,"' have been rejected or greatly modified in an increasing number
of jurisdictions; and the constant hammering of the advocates of
plaintiffs will cause even more extensive modifications to come.
Liability of landowners and operators engaged in activities
dangerous to the occupants of neighboring premises has become
7 4 Ibid. Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corp., 282 F.2d 74 (5th
Cir. 1960); Burr v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 104(1954); Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958); Sullivan v. Crab-
tree, 258 S.W.2d 782 (Tenn. App. 1953).
71 Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rep. 28 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1960); Railway Express Agency v. Brabham, 62 So. 2d 713 (Fla.
1953); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 17 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Natason v.
Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 350 P.2d 1093, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Poliquin v. Mc-
Donald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Ferrera v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.
2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958); Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75,
154 N.E.2d 534 (1958); Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960),
noted, 63 W. VA. L. Rlv. 83 (1960); Sundquist v. Madison Ry., 197 Wis.
83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928); Hambrook v. Stokes, [1925] 1 K.B. 141.
76 Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954);
Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957); Parker v. Port Huron
Hospital, 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960); Kojis v. Doctors Hospital,
12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131 (1960).
77 Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District, 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961);
Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 I1. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Williams
v. City of Detroit, 111 N.W.2d 1 (Mich.) 1961; McLeod v. Grant County School
Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953).
78 Carlson v. Chisholm-Moore Hoist Corp., 281 F.2d 766 (2d Cir.
1960); Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. Entsler, 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960);
Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575 (1960); Spence
v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply Co., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d
873 (1958); Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958); Rogers
v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1957); see,
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1100 (1960).
79 Supra note 71; Waynich v. Chicago Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322
(7th Cir. 1959); Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill. 2d 614, 124 N.E.2d
836 (1955); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Griggs
Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942); Flies v. Fox
Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928).
80 Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908 (3rd Cir.
1948); Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948); Comment,
Liability for Personal Injuries from Defective Housing, 20 U. Cm. L. Rnv.
273 (1953).
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especially severe." The risks in operations having great potential
danger against which neither the operator nor the neighbor can
provide protection are more and more imposed on the operator
as a risk of enterprise though there are some surprisingly doctrinaire
decisions still being made.2 Similar expansions of liability are found
in cases involving assault, 3 privacy,84 false imprisonment," pro-
tection against high pressure collection tactics, 6 frauds of all types,"
services rendered in high level commercial transactions, 8 protection
81 Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d. 1 (1948); Green v.
General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P.2d 952, 60 A.L.R. 475 (1928);
Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312 (Ore. 1961); Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 221
Ore. 786, 342 P.2d 790 (1959); Bedell v. Goulter, 199 Ore. 344, 261 P.2d 842
(1953); Wallace v. A. H. Guion & Co., 237 S.C. 349, 117 S.E.2d 359 (1960);
Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting Co., 118 S.E.2d (W. Va. 1961); Baker,
An Eclipse of Fault Liability, 40 VA. L. REv. 273 (1954); Gregory, Trespass to
Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359 (1951); Morris, Hazard-
ous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952); Green,
Hazardous Oil and Gas Operations; Tort Liability, 33 TExAs L. REv. 574
(1955).
82 Reynolds v. W. H. Hinman Co., 145 Me. 343, 75 A.2d 802, 20 A.L.R.2d
1360 (1950); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 Ati. 627
(1934); Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936).
83 Tate v. Canonica, supra note 75, noted 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1047
(1960); 15 RUTGERS L. Rnv. 134 (1960); Johns v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203,
208 N.W. 814, 46 A.L.R. 772 (1926); Mitron v. Williamson, 21 Misc. 2d
106, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Buchanan v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
115 S.C. 433, 106 S.E. 159, 18 A.L.R. 1414 (1920); Geissler v. Geissler,
66 Wash. 150, 164 Pac. 746, 4 A.L.R. 804 (1917).
84Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931); Roach v.
Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958); see generally Note, 44
VA. L. REv. 1303 (1958).
85 Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Lethcoe, 279 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1960),
noted, 63 W. VA. L. R.v. 196 (1961); Collyer v. S. H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal.
2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936); Ashland Dry Goods Co. v. Wages, 302 Ky. 577,
199 S.W.2d 312 (1946).
8 6 Bowdein v. Spiegel, 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (1950);
Biederman's, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959); Housh v. Peth,
165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956); Green, Mental Suffering Inflicted
by Loan Sharks No Wrong, 31 TExAs L. REv. 471 (1953).
8 7 Morgan v. Graham, 228 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1956); Elk Ref. Co. v.
Daniel, 199 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1952); Morrison v. Goodspeed, 100 Colo.
470, 68 P.2d 458, 71 P.2d 154 (1937); Tone v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 286
Ill. App. 169, 3 N.E.2d 142 (1936); Kabatchnick v. Hanover Elm Bldg.
Corp., 328 Mass. 341, 103 N.E.2d 692 (1951); Cauverien v. De Metz, 20
Misc. 2d 144, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1959); noted 62 W. VA. L. REv.
101 (1959).
88 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 74 A.L.R.
1139 (1931), noted 26 ILL L. REv. 49 (1931); see, commentary, Liability
of Persons Supplying Information for Trade Purposes, in GREEN, MALONE,
PEDiux & Rxm, CASES ON INjuRiES TO RELATIONS 91 (1958).
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of family relations, 9 and protection against abuse of governmental
power and violation of political rights."
INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYEE
In some areas tort law was unable to respond to the changing
environment and legislatures have had to take over. During the
1800's the scales had been so heavily weighted against the industrial
employee that the courts were unable to rescue him from the
doctrinal involvements of master-servant litigation. However sympa-
thetic trial judge or jury might be, they could not successfully avoid
the crystallized rules that denied him damages for his injury and
in the overwhelming number of cases he went uncompensated. The
industrial employer, although successful in litigation, suffered losses
in litigation expenses, time consumed in trials, morale of his em-
ployees and the respect of the industrial community. The courts
had no solution for the situation and by the end of the century
public reaction was so strong that over a relatively short period leg-
islatures enacted workmen's compensation acts which relieved the
courts of the largest segment of personal injury and death cases.'
However short this legislation falls in doing full justice to the injured
employee or his family, everyone would agree that the compensation
system is far superior to court administration through negligence law.
Significantly, the employees of railroads had sufficient political
power to obtain congressional legislation modifying contributory neg-
19 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 23 A.L.R.2d 1366 (D.C. Cir.
1950); Dini v. Naiditch, supra note 75; cf., Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958); Green, Protection of the Family
Under Tort Law, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 237 (1958); see Latham v. Karger, 267
Ala. 433, 103 So. 2d 336 (1958), noted 11 ALA. L. REV. 187 (1959); Webber
v. Gray, 228 Ark. 289, 307 S.W.2d 80 (1957); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.
2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. App.
1953); Montgomery v. Stephen, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Miller
v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949); Pickle v. Page, 252
N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650, 72 A.L.R. 842 (1930); Becker v. Reich, 19 Misc.
2d 104, 188 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 13 App. Div. 2d 611, 214
N.Y.S.2d 632 (1959), noted 62 W. VA. L. REv. 206 (1960); Brownlee v.
Pratt, 77 Ohio App. 533, 68 N.E.2d 798 (1946); Johnson v. Peoples First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958); Hoekstra v.
Helgeland, 98 N.W.2d 669 (S.D. 1959); Lough v. Ward [1945] 2 All. E.R.
338 (K.B.); Note, Damages for Loss of Consortium, 46 VA. L. REv. 184
(1960).9 Barrows v. Jackson, 246 U.S. 248 (1953); Geach v. Moynahan, 207
F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1953); Hardy v. Vial, 49 Cal. 2d 577, 311 P.2d 494
(1957); Burden v. Hoover, 9 Ill. 2d 114, 137 N.E.2d 59 (1958); Kenyon v.
City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946); Everett v. Harron,
380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1958).
91 See, MALONE, LOUISIANA COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE 37-39
(1951). By 1930 all the states except four had compensation acts.
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ligence as a defense in personal injury and death cases arising out of
interstate commerce. Later by amendment the defense of assump-
tion of risk was also removed. Similar statutes are found in some
of the states with respect to injuries arising in intra-state commerce.
At first, the reactions of practically all courts to this legislation were
restrictive. Common law defenses forbidden under one doctrine were
bootlegged in under the name of some other doctrine. More recently,
under the strict supervision of a slender majority of the Supreme
Court, the employee is given as full protection as could be expected."2
A considerable segment of the profession disapproves the decisions
of the court in marginal cases. 3 The mechanical application of
nineteenth century negligence defense doctrines still finds strong
support by many lawyers and by some courts.
CVL RIGHTS
One of the great areas of tort law which has laid dormant for
a long period and which is now demanding and receiving attention
is that of political and civil rights of the individual. Here the courts
and tort law have largely defaulted. There is no other phase of our
social well being that has been so completely and closely controlled
by local environment. This is shown not only by the affirmative
investigations and prosecutions conducted by legislative and execu-
tive officials in their attempts to reach "subversives," but equally
so by the absence of protection of the citizen's right to vote, or to
share on a basis of equality community services such as education,
transportation, amusements, and playgrounds, the choice of resi-
dence and other rights of citizenship. It would seem that in a govern-
ment such as ours neither constitution nor statute should have
been required to protect these rights of citizenship. But we have
had constitutional provisions and statutes in support of them for a
long time and still our progress has moved at less than deliberate
speed. We know how our first national civil rights statutes were
rendered ineffective by the federal courts, 4 and how the courts of
most of the states in which there were local statutes reduced them
92 Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482,-488
(1956); see, McMillan v. Western Pac. R.R., 54 Cal. 2d 841, 357 P.2d
449 (1960).
9 See, Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15 (1959) and appendix
to opinion by Douglas, J., for list of cases and dissents; MmLE, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON TORTS 127 (1960).94 Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Litigation, 50 MICH.
L. REv. 323 (1952). See, Plessy v. Gerguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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to a practical nullity;9" how only recently have some states given
their statutes full effect;96 and we are now witnessing at this late date
how impossible it is in some jurisdictions to secure for Negro citizens
the right to send their children to desegregated public schools even
though their rights have the support of the courts as the law of the
land. Theoretically, nothing more than a tort suit for damages against
those who obstruct the enjoyment of such rights, plus the equitable
remedy of injunction, would be required. But when citizens en
masse, local judges and juries refuse recognition of the rights, tort
law, statute law, and the Constitution seem equally helpless to
provide protection. Whether the national environment with all its
available instrumentalities can prevail over the intractable local en-
vironment is still an open question.97 This much may be ventured.
The rights of citizenship can never receive full protection until local
environments respond favorably.
In other areas losses have been registered. Libel and slander
actions in the political area have suffered a great decline as the free-
dom of speech and press have gained more and more protection. 8
We are not yet sure whether on balance this is gain or loss. Some
legislatures under the influence of pressure groups have withdrawn
protection to the family in what are called "heart balm" cases. 9
While some consider this a gain, ' others feel that it is one of the
rare instances in which legislatures and courts have been imposed
upon by a shrewdly conducted campaign behind a facade of feigned
moral indignation. The limited protection of the family built up
by the courts over a long period was piously ripped away by some
legislatures and courts with the result that sexual pirates have open
95 Fletcher v. Coney Island, 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956),
noted 26 U. CINc. L. Rzv. 116 (1957), 105 U. PA. L. REv. 115 (1956); see
note, Private Remedies under State Equal Rights Statutes, 44 ILL. L. RV. 363
(1949).96 District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 348 U.S. 100 (1953);
Everett v. Harron, supra note 90; note, Civil Rights Acts; Scope and Equitable
Enforcement, 35 CALiF. L. REv. 571 (1947).97 But see Monroe v. Pape, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961); Progress Dev. Corp.
v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401
(5th Cir. 1961).
98 Green, The Right to Communicate, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 903 (1960).
9 9 Siegal v. Soloman, 19 Ill. 2d 145, 166 N.E.2d 5 (1960); Smith V.
Hill, 12 Ill. 2d 588, 147 N.E.2d 321 (1959); Heck v. Schull, 384 Ill. 296,
68 N.E.2d 464 (1946) noted 42 ILL. L. Rv. 233 (1946); Pennington v.
Stewart, 211 Ind. 653, 10 N.E.2d 619 (1937); Magierowski v. Buckley, 39
N.J. Super. 534, 121 A.2d 749 (1956).
'
0oBohlen, Fifty Years of Tort Law, 50 HARV. L. Rav. 1225, 1246-48
(1937).
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season on seducable spouses and especially the "maidens from the
other side of the tracks," leaving the family unprotected at its most
vulnerable point.
THE AUTOMOBILE AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
Of all the factors which have stimulated the development of
tort law in the twentieth century none equals the influence of the
motor vehicle with its ghastly slaughter and maiming of those who
use the highways. As the motor vehicle has become the chief catalyst
of our economy, likewise it is the chief support directly and indirectly
of tort law and those connected with its administration."' A great
insurance enterprise sprang up almost overnight to take over the
defense of those who feared the liabilities imposed by tort law in
behalf of the victim of the motor vehicle. A movement is gaining
momentum to require every motorist to provide liability insurance
so that behind every defendant motorist will be found a solvent
insurance company. And, if prudent for the motorist, why not prudent
for other prospective tort-feasors; the shopkeeper, the home owner,
the contractor, manufacturer, hospital, doctor, municipality, operator
of any type? And so the idea grows. With insurance, tort law took
on new dimensions; tort cases now consume a large part of the
time of the important trial courts of the country and the number
of courts and judges are increased at nearly every term of most legis-
latures. Supreme courts in many states must have intermediate ap-
pellate courts to carry the load of litigation and the writing of
opinions. New procedures are required; discovery, pre-trial hearings,
use of scientific evidence given by expensive expert witnesses, special
sections in the bar associations, how-to-do-it institutes, publications
devoted to the interests of the litigants, more and more books on
the law of torts and on some of its important sub-divisions. Nor does
the influence of insurance stop here. Courts are opening their dockets
to inter-family suits of spouse against spouse,' 2 or the estate of
the offending spouse;' ° ' minor child against minor child;"°4 child
101 GREEN, TRAFFIC VIcnMs (1958).
102Silverman v. Silverman, 145 Conn. 663, 145 A.2d 826 (1958);
Brown v. Gosser, supra note 89; contra, Campbell v. Campbell, 114 S.E.2d
406 (W. Va. 1960).
,o3 Johnson v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., supra note 89.
104 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) noted 42
VA. L. REv. 687 (1956); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960).
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against parent and parent against child." 5 Verdicts given by juries
and affirmed by appellate courts grow larger and in turn insurance
coverage and rates are increased correspondingly.
While the doctrines with their refinements are still great handi-
caps for plaintiffs and correspondingly protective of defendants and
their insurers, in some jurisdictions they are used primarily by ap-
pellate courts to maintain drastic control over trial courts and juries.
Doctrines do not seem too important to juries as long as they
understand their effect upon the ultimate judgment, and thus the
great efforts by defense lawyers, with less and less aid from the
courts, is to keep the jury in ignorance of the existence and the
amount of insurance available.' 6 And thus, also, there is preference
for the special issue method of submission as a substitute for the
general verdict,"0 7 and for separate trials on the issues of liability
and damages.' 8
The layman's evaluation of insurance is different from that of
the lawyer. "Why," he asks, "if the motorist pays for insurance to
protect him if he hurts someone, should not the insurance company
pay the loss as it does in case of fire or theft? Why all the trouble
and expense of a lawsuit? Why should a purchaser of insurance
buy a lawsuit in which he has no voice as to the settlement or the
defense of the claim? Why not protection for the injury done at
least within the limits provided by the policy?" The layman's point
of view is slowly sinking in on the lawyer, the judge, and the legis-
lator. It cannot be long before they concede the point and take open
steps to accommodate it to the law. In the meantime, the existence
of insurance is known both by judge and jury and it is more and
more difficult to mix negligence law and insurance in the same
case. The universality of liability insurance overloads the law and
the courts. Its influence penetrates all other cases of negligence law,
and even as retooled by 1960 patterns the load of litigation is more
than the courts can handle with trial by jury and appellate review.
In this impasse litigants must either settle their cases at considerable
105 Supra note 89; Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 IIl. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525
(1960); Talbert v. Talbert, 22 Misc. 2d 782, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct.
1960); Decker v. Decker, 20 Misc. 2d 438, 193 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct.
1959); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Parker
v. Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 94 S.E.2d 12, 60 A.L.R.2d 1280 (1956).
106 Green, Blindfolding the Jury (pts. 1-2), 33 TExAs L. REV. 157, 273(1954), 34 Id. 382 (1956); see, Flanagan v. Mott, 114 S.E.2d 331 (W. Va.
1960).
107 Green, Special Issues, 14 TsxAs B.J. 521 (1951).
'
0 8Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960).
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discount or run the risk of losing their cases by the erosion of time-
the disappearance or unavailability of witnesses, the fading of mem-
ories, absorption of their lawyers' interest by other litigation, and
the feeling of futility on the part of the victim himself or his loss
of courage to litigate. Lapse of time between injury and final judg-
ment has become so great as largely to defeat the protection law
provides for the victim.
CONCLUSION
By whatever standards tort law is measured, it will be found
to impose increasingly stricter and heavier liabilities upon defendants
in behalf of their victims. The imposition upon the defendant of
the risks created by his activities; his capacity to bear and/or
distribute the losses as a part and incident of the costs of doing
business or through insurance; the feeling that any dangerous activity
should make provision for the losses it may inflict; the acceptance
of these notions by people in general; and the recognition by a
large segment of the profession that a law suit is more than a con-
test governed by procedures, rules, and arguments are largely re-
sponsible for this front-line advance of tort law. How far the ad-
vance will be pushed depends upon many factors later to be dis-
cussed, but the overtopping factor that has characterized the advance
to this date would seem to be the faith of the courts and of advocates
who appear before them that the heart of tort law is the litigation
process; that doctrines, theories, rules, and formulas are merely the
means of making the process operational; and that the process,
manned as it is by both laymen and legal experts, is designed to
respond and must necessarily respond, to the environment of the
period. ' °9
This faith has been greatly shaken by failure of the litigation
process to meet the ever-increasing needs of the victims of the high-
ways. The question now arises, can it meet the needs of an en-
vironment dominated by the machines of air traffic and the even
more dangerous machines and processes for the production and
uses of our newly found source of energy in the atom?
(Part II of this article will appear in the February issue.)
109 See Green, The Influence of Environment on the Litigation Process,
20 LA. L. REv. 548 (1960).
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